The St Nazaire Raid - Operation Chariot
Background
Operation Chariot was an audacious Combined Operation raid on the port of St Nazaire in German occupied France. Packed with tons of high explosives, the destroyer, HMS Campbeltown, was rammed into the gates of the only dry dock capable of servicing the German battleship Tirpitz. Such was the damage, the dry dock was rendered unusable for the remainder of the war. In the second week of January 1942, the powerful German battleship, Tirpitz, moved from the Baltic, through the Kiel canal and north to Trondheim on the Norwegian coast. From there, it had the potential to break out into the North Atlantic and to wreak havoc on allied Atlantic convoys. C in C Home Fleet, Admiral Tovey, opined that to sink the Tirpitz would be "of incomparably greater importance to the conduct of the war than the safety of any convoy." Churchill shared this view, commenting that "the entire naval situation throughout the world would be altered." Four separate attempts to bomb the Tirpitz failed, with the loss of 12 aircraft. A different strategy was required. The Germans needed dry-dock facilities on the Atlantic coast, before the battleship could be deployed effectively against allied convoys and the only suitable port was St. Nazaire. It lay on the north bank of the River Loire about 6 miles from the river mouth, which itself was about 6 miles wide. The Planning Division in the Admiralty, conceived the idea to destroy the lock gate at St Nazaire which would render the dry dock unusable. The idea was picked up by Captain Charles Lambe (who became First Sea Lord from 1959 to 1960). He took the idea to Mountbatten, head of Combined Operations - the first outside client for COHQ. The target area was bordered by the River Loire, the waters of the outer harbour and the Basin of St Nazaire - a total area of less than one square mile. The heavy concentration of enemy defensive positions and troops in the area strongly reflected the importance of the port facilities to them. It was, arguably, the most heavily defended place along the whole of the German occupied Atlantic coast. In this confined space there were power stations, pumping stations, warehouses, lock installations and the old town of St Nazaire. Denying the Germans use of the dry dock would effectively neutralize the threat the Tirpitz posed.
The Plan
The estuary was a complex mixture of mud flats and channels. A frontal assault would, therefore, need a shallow draught vessel running on a high tide. Although heavily defended, the Germans were unlikely to have considered an attack across the mud flats and shoals. Meticulous planning followed and advice sought on the vagaries of tides and winds, which included studying French nautical charts and tables up to 100 years old! The outline plan was simple. The selected vessel, packed with high explosives in the bow with troops and crew in protected areas, would ram the outer lock gate at speed and become firmly stuck there. They would then disembark and take cover behind a nearby air-raid shelter. The ship would then blow up destroying the gate. A Motor Torpedo Boat would then approach to fire especially designed torpedoes at the inner gate which would collapse under pressure when the tide went out, damaging the submarines berthed in their protected pens. The troops and crew would then destroy as many dockyard targets as they could and withdraw in fast motor launches which had followed them in. All this was to be achieved under cover of an air raid. The planners, themselves, had reservations about the withdrawal phase which was difficult to predict since much depended on the element of surprise and the effectiveness of the opposing forces. However, the risks were less than the potential rewards. Outside the planning circle, the Naval C in C Plymouth, thought the vessel would bounce off the gate, a view he maintained against the advice of the engineer who built it. He also thought that anyone within half a mile of the explosion would be killed. Mountbatten conceded the point about the destructive power of the explosion and delayed action fuses were to be fitted to allow time for the troops and crew to evacuate the area. However, on the question of the use of a boat to ram the lock gate, he held firm. It was also decided to spread the raiding force between the main ship and the supporting motor launches, simply to avoid the total loss of the force in the event of disaster befalling the main ship. HMS Campbeltown, an American lend-lease destroyer (USS Buchanan), was chosen to lead the operation. Her interior was stripped out, the bridge was armour-plated and additional protection provided for the Commandos she would carry. The accompanying motor launches (MLs), were to carry 150 Commandos. The boats were fitted with two Oerlikon 20mm guns and additional fuel tanks to increase their range. As the needs of the raid were reassessed, the ML fleet was increased to 10 and then to 14. Only one motor gun boat (MGB) was available - MGB 314, a C-Class Fairmile, commanded by Lt. Dunstan Curtis. She would lead the attack with motor torpedo boat (MTB) 74 in reserve. This was equipped with unproven flying torpedoes to breach the dry dock gates if the Campbeltown failed to reach its target.
The Battle
The fleet sailed from Falmouth at 3 pm on the 26th of March. MGB 314, was at the head with two escort destroyers flanking the MLs and HMS Campbeltown. South west of Ushant, they came across a U-Boat and damaged it. They departed the area on a false course which the submarine duly reported to their command and control HQ. Five German torpedo boats left St Nazaire to engage the vessels but in entirely the wrong direction. They were still at sea during the raid. Around midnight on the 27/28th March, the raiders saw bomb flashes and tracers light the sky. The diversionary bombing air raid had started but it lacked accuracy due to low cloud causing an alert in the town and its approaches, rather than the intended effect of keeping the German forces in their bunkers. The bombers had been briefed to target only specific military installations to avoid civilian casualties. Those who failed to identify their targets, did not drop their bombs. Each boat flew the German flag to confuse the enemy and delay identification. Submarine, HMS Sturgeon, provided the exact position for entry to the estuary from which the raiding force was to make its run up the estuary. The Campbeltown crept through at 5 knots, touching bottom twice. At 0120 hours, search lights illuminated the entire fleet but, for a short time, the Germans were reluctant to open fire possibly because of confusion caused by spoof signals and a general disbelief that such an audacious raid could be undertaken. The German flags were then replaced with White Ensigns when the fleet was still two miles from its target. The Germans responded with intense shelling and gun fire during the final 15 minutes of the run in, during which half the men aboard the MLs were either killed or wounded. The Campbeltown cleared the estuary and increased speed to break through the torpedo barrier and into the dock gate. The MLs were all but stopped, only two succeeded in landing their full complement of Commandos. Other MLs approached the landing zones, but were forced to re-embark their Commandos in the face of very heavy fire from 20mm cannons. On shore fighting was ferocious and close quartered. At 0134 hours, Campbeltown was successfully driven at speed into the dock gates just 4 minutes behind schedule. Most of her crew were taken aboard MGB 314 while MTB 74 deployed her delayed action torpedoes in the foundations of the old entrance dock gate. Captain Ryder, CO of the Naval forces, went ashore and satisfied himself that Campbeltown was both scuttled and embedded in the loch gate. At 0230 hours, Ryder decided to withdraw. By this time, more than half of his craft had been destroyed and the remainder were riddled.... if he didn't withdraw soon, he would lose them all. MTB 74, departed the area of action to rendezvous with British destroyers in the open sea off the Loire. She carried 26 men on board and was accompanied by 7 other craft. She stopped to pick up two more survivors, but was hit by accurate shelling from shore batteries. Only 3 of the 34 aboard survived. The remaining craft met the 5 German torpedo boats returning from their fruitless mission. In further enemy fire, more craft were destroyed or scuttled and their crews transferred to the remaining craft. Of the 18 coastal craft, which set out from Falmouth, only four returned.
Aftermath
The Normandie Dock months after the raid. The wreck of HMS Campbeltown is dwarfed by the size of the dock The explosion put the dry dock out of commission until the end of the war. The St Nazaire raid had been a success, but at a cost. Of the 622 men of the Royal Navy and Commandos who took part in the raid, only 228 men returned to England. Five escaped overland via Spain and Gibraltar. 169 men were killed (105 RN and 64 Commandos) and another 215 became prisoners of war (106 RN and 109 Commandos). They were first taken to La Baule and then sent to Stalag 133 at Rennes. The fallen British raiders were buried at the Escoublac-la-Baule cemetery with military honors. The cemetery is located 13 kilometres west of St Nazaire. To recognise their achievement, 89 decorations were awarded for the raid. This total includes the five Victoria Crosses awarded to Lieutenant Commander Beattie, Lieutenant Colonel Newman and Commander Ryder, and posthumous awards to Sergeant Durrant and Able Seaman Savage. Other decorations awarded were four Distinguished Service Orders, four Conspicuous Gallantry Medals, five Distinguished Conduct Medals, 17 Distinguished Service Crosses, 11 Military Crosses, 24 Distinguished Service Medals and 15 Military Medals. Four men were awarded the Croix de Guerre by France, another 51 were mentioned in dispatches. Adolf Hitler was furious that the British had been able to sail a flotilla of ships up the Loire unhindered. His immediate reaction was to dismiss Generaloberst Carl Hilpert, chief-of-staff to the Commander in Chief West. The raid refocused German attention on the Atlantic Wall, and special attention was given to ports to prevent any repeat of the raid. By June 1942 the Germans began using concrete to fortify gun emplacements and bunkers in quantities previously only used in U-boat pens. Hitler laid out new plans in a meeting with Armaments Minister Albert Speer in August 1942, calling for the construction of 15,000 bunkers by May 1943 to defend the Atlantic coast from Norway to Spain. The battleship Tirpitz never entered the Atlantic. She remained in Norwegian fjords to threaten Allied shipping until she was destroyed by the RAF on 12 November 1944. St Nazaire was one of the 38 battle honours presented to the Commandos after the war. The raid has since been called The Greatest Raid of All. The survivors formed their own association, the St Nazaire Society, which is a registered charity in the United Kingdom.
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